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This article traces the development of American copyright law as it 
applies to architectural works from its earliest foundations in the 
United States Constitution until the enactment of the Architectural 
Works Copyright Protection Act in 1990. By focusing on the 
outcomes of the latest legislation through recent case law affecting 
residential design, the authors evaluate the effectiveness of the 
protection and illustrate some unintended consequences. In 
addition, they discuss architectural originality and its relationship to 
legal protection in the context of individual design freedom. 
The concept of originality in architectUral design 
creates some interesting issues for the profession. 
While architects regularly struggle with creating new, 
innovative design solutions, they often need to use 
traditional andfor conventional architectural 
configurations. Clients' requirements and 
expectations often influence the degree of originality 
in a project, which may be further influenced by 
budgetary constraints, site limitations, available 
construction materials, zoning ordinances, building 
codes and design review boards. The issue of originality 
provides even more challenges when considered from 
a legal perspective, particularly in light of the relatively 
recent enactment in the United States of the 
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act 1990 (the 
AWCP Act) (United States Congress, 1990a). This 
legislation was enacted to bring U.S. copyright law into 
adherence with the Berne Convention, an 
international treaty dealing with intellectual property, 
and was drafted to provide greater protection for 
architects in retaining ownership of their intellectual 
property. We believe that the Act is far from perfect and 
may have resulted in several unexpected outcomes 
that do not favour the architect. 
This article will focus on residential architecture, 
which has generated a noticeable amount of 
litigation since the passage of the AWCP Act. By 
reference to substantive issues raised during recent 
cases, we will also evaluate the usefulness of the 
legislation to the architectural profession, and will 
discuss the concept of architectural originality, the 
need for its protection, and its ultimate impact on 
the professional and the physical environment. 
Protection before the 1990 AWCP Act 
The origins of copyright protection for architectural 
designs have foundations in the United States 
Constitution (Article I) and the original Federal 
Copyright Acts of 1790 and 1909. Before the AWCP Act 
was passed, most contemporary architectural works 
in the U.S. derived copyright protection, if any, from 
the 1976 Copyright Act. Case law based upon the 1976 
Act indicates that protection was quite limited, due 
largely to the omission of either architectural plans 
or designs -both deemed 'useful articles' -which 
meant that virtually no building (beyond a few 
monuments and decorative elements) was covered 
(Demetriadis v. Kaufmann, 1988). The Act afforded 
some protection to architectural drawings, which 
'We believe that the Act is far from perfect 
and may have resulted in several 
unexpected outcomes that do not favour 
the architect' 
were conceived as similar to the work of an author or 
artist, and which were therefore capable of some 
coverage of their intellectual merit. Courts, however, 
tended to distinguish between the drawings 
themselves and the ideas they encapsulated so that, 
as long as only the building and not the drawings 
that were created to incorporate them were copied, 
no liability could ensue (Imperial Home v. Lamont, 
1972). 
Copyright protection for architectural works came 
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under review when the United States joined the 
Berne Convention in 1989, a move precipitated by the 
huge financial losses suffered by U.S. copyright 
owners to overseas countries where no bilateral 
copyright agreementwithAmerica existed. To 
understand the 1990 amendments to the Copyright 
Act, some background on the Berne Convention will 
be helpful. By the time of the first Berne Treaty in 
1886, no member country provided specific statutory 
protection for architectural works, and the issue of 
copyright protection for architecture was first 
addressed in the 1986 Paris Conference of the Berne 
Convention (Ricketson, 1987). Some delegates 
opposed expansion of coverage for architects for fear 
that even the most common structures would be 
entitled to copyright protection. 
The national laws of Berne member countries are 
not uniform with regard to architecture, and foreign 
statutes have failed to provide much guidance in 
determining whether an individual work merited 
copyright protection (Pinner, 1960). Consequently, 
the Berne member countries have taken a variety of 
approaches to copyright protection for architectural 
works (Hewett, 1985). 
In the U.S. Congressional hearings on adherence to 
the Berne Convention, it became obvious that the 
'problem' in the American approach to copyright 
protection for architecture had never been much 
more than a peripheral concern for legislators 
(United States Copyright Office, 1989). Moreover, 
American architects did not unite behind the 
principle of expanded protection for architecture 
(United States Congress, 1988). 
During the 1988 Berne Convention hearings, the 
American Institute of Architects initially supported a 
bill that would have expanded copyright protection 
for architectural structures. Later, however, the 
organization dropped its support for the provision 
because the official position was not shared by all of 
'Some delegates opposed expansion of 
coverage for architects for fear that even 
the most common structures would be 
entitled to copyright protection' 
its members (United States Copyright Office, 1989). 
The hearings before the U.S. House of Representatives 
on the AWCP Act show that prominent architects 
expressed apprehension that copyright protection 
might affect their ability to use elements from the 
work of other architects: 'Our concern is that the 
well-accepted traditions of reference and limited 
borrowing of elements and details should be 
suppressed' (United States Congress, 199ob). 
Nevertheless, Congress determined that the 
Copyright Act should be modified to align with the 
more restrictive provisions of the European treaty as 
expressed in the section concerning Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works. The Berne treaty is 
recognized by many nations as creating the 
appropriate standards for copyright protection, 
which are held as natural rights rather than solely 
statutory obligations. Accordingly, Congress passed 
the AWCP Act in 1990, creating extensive new 
protection for architects and their work in the 
United States. 
A review of the AWCP Act, 1990 
The new legislation expands the copyright 
protection afforded to architectural works, defined 
as 'the design of a building as embodied in any 
tangible medium of expression, including a 
building, architectural plans and drawings'. It also 
extends much further into the realm of the 
protection of ideas and originality than previous 
Acts, and makes U.S.law more compatible with over 
24 other countries regarding copyright issues. 
However, the AWCP Act has not existed without 
criticism, and a review ofliterature generated in the 
aftermath of the Act's creation indicates a number of 
perceived problems (Hixon, 1995; Hancks, 1996; 
Newsam, 1997; Pollack, 1992; Ray, 1995; Thiel, 1996). 
For example, the AWCP Act covers those entities 
defined as 'architectural works', including both 
habitable and non-habitable structures (such as 
churches and gazebos), but specifically excludes 
other forms of three-dimensional structures such as 
clover leaves, pedestrian walkways and bridges 
(Pollack, 1992). Given the recent surge of design 
excellence brought to the last category by such 
luminaries as the Spanish architect/engineer 
Santiago Calatrava, the anomalies of the arbitrary 
limitations of protection are evident. It is not clear 
whether less easily defined structures that could 
potentially imbue. architectural excellence and 
which certainly have a demonstrable physical 
presence, such as parking garages, grain silos or even 
free-standing walls, are afforded copyright 
protection. Thus, while some structures may have no 
protection, others, which may already have 
protection as sculptural works or 'artistic 
statements', may arguably be afforded dual coverage 
by the provisions of the AWCP Act, which overlays 
existing legislation in this field. 
Similarly, criticism has been directed towards the 
two-part test for copyrightability under the AWCP 
Act, which seeks, first, to establish whether any 
original design elements exist and, second, whether 
these elements are functionally required (Scholl, 
1992). The critics claim that the test is vety difficult to 
administer without a strictly limited interpretation 
of the terms, and therefore that it may ultimately 
provide little more protection than the 1976 Act 
(Scalione, 1992; Scholl, 1992; Winnick, 1992). 
There is also the potential for confusion as to the 
legitimate owner of copyright- the architect, the 
architectural practice, the party commissioning the 
work or the builder of the work- and the degree to 
which originality, and therefore protection, can be 
attributed to individual structures (Pollack, 1992). 
The AWCP Act states that copyrightable material 
must be 'an original work of authorship', although 
quality, aesthetic merit, ingenuity or uniqueness are 
not necessarily factors in its determination. It is 
important that such work contains a minimum 
amount of original creative expression and that 
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protection is not given to standard designs such as 
common architectural features, nor any functionally 
required elements such as structural walls, doors or 
windows. Arguably, standard configurations found 
in small houses and apartments, particularly 
bathrooms or kitchens, are not protected. The 
distinction between original creation and functional 
necessity may become difficult, particularly in 
smaller design projects where the range of design 
elements and variables is more limited. 
Since the AWCP Act has been in effect for almost a 
decade, it is time to evaluate its overall impact on 
architects, builders and others who are potential 
plaintiffs or defendants in architectural works 
copyright litigation. The next section of the paper 
will therefore address several major issues arising 
from disputes concerning copyright protection that 
have recently emerged. 
The Act in operation: unintended drawbacks 
While it is reasonable to conclude that the AWCP Act 
is an improvement on the previous protection 
afforded to architects in protecting not just their 
drawings but also their ideas, several recent disputes 
have illuminated some drawbacks, or unintended 
consequences, of the Act's provisions. The authors 
have identified five specific issues for discussion: 
1. Who has the right to sue? 
An initial reading of the Act would suggest that the 
protection of copyright is afforded to the creator of 
the idea -logically the architect. However, in most 
cases involving architectural works, the plaintiff has 
not been the designer, but a secondary party to whom 
copyright ownership had been assigned, typically a 
developer or builder. Most of the defendants named 
in suits alleging copyright infringement involving 
architectural works are also builders- in fact, the 
plaintiff's competitors. This raises interesting issues 
regarding the original purpose of the legislation to 
protect creativity when that creative idea has become 
a commodity to be sold or transferred to a third party 
for their ownership and use. 
2. How can damages be apportioned fairly for copyright 
violation? 
The problem of providing a remedy for infringement 
has led to some interesting, and perhaps unforeseen 
developments. While damages in several recent cases 
have been determined based upon the architect's loss 
of profit according to his/her fee scale, there have 
also been some attempts to push the concept of 
damages beyond simply the cost of the design work 
to the cost of the actual property and even to the 
potential income derived from that property over its 
useful life. In a recent case (settled before trial), the 
plaintiff, a contractor/developer who claimed to own 
the copyright of an unremarkable group of 
apartment buildings, sued the owner of a similar 
building some distance away. The claim extended 
beyond the loss of fees to design the project, and even 
beyond the loss of profit the contractor claimed for 
not building the second project. It included not only 
the cost of the buildings themselves but, by a 
remarkable stretch oflogic, the rental income of the 
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alleged infringing apartment for a period of 40 years 
- a total claim exceeding the modest architectural 
services fee by hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
While the immediate remedy provided by the Act to 
architects in securing reasonable fees for their 
legitimate work is useful, the extent to which claims 
can be made for loss of profit is still unclear, and may 
lead to further enormously inflated claims until 
some clarity is brought to the situation. 
3· To what extent does copyright protection address 
standard features, functional elements and basic design 
ideas? 
Determining what constitutes a protectable 
architectural structure is a variation of the familiar 
and troublesome question of what constitutes a 'work 
of art'. This is a major issue for consideration, 
'The AWCPAct states that copyrightable 
material must be 'an original work of 
authorship', although quality, aesthetic 
merit, ingenuity or uniqueness are not 
necessarily factors in its determination' 
particularly with regard to residential designs, which 
are often dictated by numerous standard, functional, 
conventional andjor code-required design features. 
Clearly, the U.S. Copyright Act does not protect all 
architectural works (Scalione, 1992). In fact, the Act 
specifically states that it does not protect standard 
configurations of spaces or individual standard 
features, covering only the artistic (non-standard) 
features and/or designs ofbuildings. Unfortunately, 
determining what is a 'standard' feature or a 'non-
standard' design element is an ad hoc and subjective 
exercise. 
Architectural creativity and progress, you could 
argue, are best served by making standard individual 
elements and configurations freely available for use 
by others. Hence, an architect's work should not 
encompass the exclusive right to use basic design 
elements such as skylights, courtyards, domes, 
columns, gables, and other basic shapes (Shipley, 
1986). Copyright protection for basic architectural 
shapes and configurations would therefore inhibit 
or preclude architects from drawing upon common 
sources, borrowing ideas, and concepts, or from 
imitating the styles of their contemporaries and 
predecessors (Brainard, 1984). Accordingly, architects 
need some latitude so that they can modify and 
perhaps improve upon basic architectural styles, 
ideas, and concepts without the threat of 
infringement actions associated with every building 
they design. Allowing architects to use copyright law 
to empower themselves to prohibit subsequent use 
of basic shapes and layouts would be problematic 
because it would create a monopoly on the standard 
features encompassed in a particular building 
(Scholl, 1992). 
Similarly, copyright protection does not extend to 
functional items in architectural works. The 
legislative history of the AWCP Act explains that the 
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Act does not protect architectural design elements 
that are determined by function (United States 
Congress, 1990c). Patent law, not copyright law, is 
designed to prevent the copying and use of 
utilitarian works such as architectural drawings and 
buildings, and courts oflaw are mindful to avoid 
interpreting the Copyright Act so as to create an 
illegitimate patent-type claim (Buecher, 1990; 
Copyright Office Report, 1989; Demetriades v. 
Kaufmann, 1988). 
According to U.S. House ofRepresentatives Report 
No. 101-735 (United States Congress, 1990c), 
functionality cannot be ignored in evaluating the 
copyrightability or scope of protection for 
architectural work Even if the Copyright Office 
issues a certificate of registration, copyright 
protection should be denied for all functionally 
'For example, the neo-Shingle Style houses 
designed by the architect, Robert A. M. 
Stern, which incorporate turrets and other 
fanciful embellishments, are likely to merit 
copyright protection, whereas the roof of a 
simple, traditional Cape Cod-style house 
should not qualify' 
determined design elements. The report states: 
'Under such circumstances, the Copyright Office 
should issue a certificate of registration, letting the 
courts determine the scope of protection'. This raises 
an important issue, of course, especially in 
residential buildings, where it could be argued that 
the majority of elements are functionally 
determined (Hewett, 1985). 
Elements such as roofs, gables and windows are 
likely to be dictated by the structure's primary 
function- providing shelter and light to the 
building's occupants. Such features cannot exist 
independently from their utilitarian aspects as 
independent works of art and, therefore, should not 
be entitled to copyright protection. 
Most house designs - especially small or low 
budget designs- are influenced by substantial 
functional considerations that may contain few non-
functional architectural design elements that would 
qualifY for copyright protection. For example, the 
neo-Shingle Style houses designed by the architect, 
Robert A.M. Stern, which incorporate turrets and 
other fanciful embellishments, are likely to merit 
copyright protection, whereas the roof of a simple, 
traditional Cape Cod-style house should not qualifY 
(Roth, 1979). 
The functionality test has been used to preclude 
copyright protection for numerous useful articles in 
the design realm. For example, a light fixture which 
had a 'pleasing shape' and was designed for use for 
outside lighting was not afforded copyright 
protection, because it was judged that no artistic 
feature was separable or distinguishable from the 
article's useful form (Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 1978). 
Similarly, the idea of a tower with an enclosed 
structure on top was equally uncopyrightable 
(Wickham v. Knoxville, 1983). 
With regard to basic design ideas incorporated 
into residential designs, copyright protection 
extends only to the particular expression of an idea, 
never to the idea itself (Reyher v. Children's 
Television, 1976). Copyright protection, unlike a 
patent, gives no exclusive right to the art itself (Mazer 
v. Stein, 1954). This idea-expression distinction is 
necessarily subjective, and where idea and 
expression are indistinguishable, copyright law will 
protect only against identical copying (Peter Pan v. 
Martin Weiner, 1960; Sid & MartyKrofftv. McDonalds, 
1977)-
An example of this problem can be found in Hubert 
Rosenthal]ewelryv. Kalpakian (1971). In that case, 
plaintiff charged the defendants with copyright 
infringement of a pin in the shape of a bee encrusted 
with jewels. While the case did not involve 
architectural works, it is instructive with regard to 
the ideal expression dichotomy. The court explained: 
We think the production ofjeweled bee pins is a larger 
private preserve than Congress intended to be set aside in 
the public market without a patent. A jeweled bee pin is 
therefore an 'idea' the defendants were free to copy. 
Plaintiff seems to agree, for it disavows any claim that 
defendants cannot manufacture and sell jeweled bee pins 
and concedes that only plaintiffs particular design or 
'expression' of the jeweled bee pin 'idea' is protected under 
its copyright. The difficulty, as we have noted, is that on 
this record the 'idea' and its 'expression' appear to be 
indistinguishable. 
In other words, when the 'idea' and its 'expression' 
are inseparable, copying the 'expression' will not be 
barred, since protecting the 'expression' in such 
circumstances would confirm a monopoly of the 
'idea' upon the copyright owner free of the 
conditions and limitations imposed by patent law. 
Similarly, in the context ofliteraryworks, courts 
have adopted a scenes a fa ire approach, these being 
stock literary devices which are not protectable by 
copyright (Reyher v. Children's Television, 1976). In 
the context of architecture, stock design elements, 
similar to stock literary devices, are not 
copyrightable. In other words, similarity of 
expression, which necessarily results from the fact 
that the common idea is only capable of expression 
in more or less stereotypical forms, precludes 
copyright protection. 
Cases such as Rosenthal Jewelry indicate that 
copyrightability should be approached as a sliding 
scale or spectrum (Concrete Mach. v. Classic Lawn, 
1988). At one end ofthe spectrum lie the 'strongest' 
works in which complex or fanciful artistic 
expressions predominate. Such works are entirely 
products of the author's creativity, rather than a 
collection of similar themes (Sid & Marty Krofft v. 
McDonalds, 1977). At the opposite end of the 
spectrum is the bee pin which was the subject work 
in Rosenthal Jewelry. In the Krafft case, the court 
explained: 'The scope of copyright protection 
increases with the extent expression differs from the 
idea'. Some residential works will certainly fall 
towards the noncopyrightable end of the spectrum. 
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In many residential designs, bedrooms, ldtchens, 
bathrooms, living rooms, dining rooms, deck/patios, 
windows, doors, stairs or gables, are no more than 
standard architectural features. Thus, the entire 
layout of some small houses will be the architectural 
equivalent of scenes a faire - and may therefore receive 
copyright protection only with proof of identical 
copying (Coates-Freeman v. Polaroid, 1992). 
Howardv. Sterchi (1992), is a case in point. In that 
case, the designer of a country-style log home 
brought suit against a company in the business of 
manufacturing and erecting log homes, alleging 
copyright infringement. On appeal, the plaintiff 
asserted that the district court erred in holding that 
there was no infringement. The federal Court of 
Appeals held that the plaintiff failed to establish 
copyright infringement of the floor plan. The court 
determined that, although the plaintiff proved that 
the defendant had access to the designs, the 
copyright infringement claim failed because the 
defendant's plans were not substantially similar to 
the plaintiff's. In determining whether the plans 
were substantially similar, the district court 
evaluated points of similarity and points of 
dissimilarity between the two plans. After this 
analysis, the court held that, although the floor 
plans were visually similar and the layout was 
generally the same, the dissimilarities were 
significant, particularly along the rooflines, the bay 
window and the dimensions. The court noted that, 
in country-style frame houses and i).l houses built 
with logs which dictate that only square angles be 
used, similarities in the general layout of rooms can 
easily occur innocently: 
The variety of ways that 2-story rectangle can be divided 
into three bedrooms, two baths, kitchen, great or a living 
room, closets, porches, etc., is finite. In architecture 
plans of this type, modest dissimilarities are 
more significant than they maybe in other types 
of artworks. 
The appellate court determined that the district 
court did not err in determining that the 
dissimilarities were significant. 
In a similar case,]. R. Lazaro Builders, Inc. v. R. E. 
Rip berger Builders, Inc. ( 1995), the court held: 
Thus, in order for there to be infringement, the substantial 
similarity must be of the protectable expression and not 
the idea itself The idea/ expression dichotomy is very 
important for copyright protection of architectural works 
and home designs; obviously, placing a bathroom 
adjacent to a bedroom or a walk-in closet in a 
master bedroom in a house are ideas not capable 
of copyright protection. Substantial similarity 
must be evaluated, instead, 'on the basis of the 
original design elements that are expressive of 
the [designer's] creativity' 
The court went on to explain that, 'the instance case 
is illustrative of the difficulty of accessing a 
designer's creativity in the context of a rather 
common house'. Both parties conceded that home 
designers regularly look to existing home designs as 
departure points for expressing their creativity, 
which therefore raises the definition and 
acceptability of derivative design (Winnick, 1992). 
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4· What is derivative design? 
Copyright law provides protection for 'derivative 
works', although this protection is quite limited. 
Most reasonably-priced residential buildings can be 
considered- at best- 'derivative', and copyright of 
derivative works is subject to two important and 
related limitations. First, the original aspects of a 
derivative work, if any, must contain some 
'substantial originality' (l. Batlin v. Snyder, 1976; 
Chamberlin v. Uris Sales, 1945). Second, the scope of 
copyright protection afforded a derivative work 
involves only the substantially original and non-
trivial features, if any, contributed by the author to 
the derivative work 
A derivative work must be substantially different 
from the underlying work to be copyrightable 
(Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, 1983). The substantial 
originality rule is designed to ensure a 'sufficiently 
gross difference' between the underlying work and 
the derivative work to avoid 'entangling' subsequent 
authors in 'copyright problems'. Failure to enforce 
the substantial originality rule would wrongfully 
inhibit the creation of any other derivative works by 
giving the first 'creator' the power to interfere with 
the creation of any subsequent works from the same 
underlying work The problem can best be illustrated 
with an analogy: 
Suppose Artist A produces a reproduction of the Mona 
Lisa, a painting in the public domain, which differs 
slightly from the original. B also makes a reproduction of 
the Mona Lisa. A, who has copyrighted his derivative work, 
sues B for infringement. B' s defense is that he was copying 
the original, not A's reproduction. But if the difference 
between the original and A's reproduction is slight, the 
difference between A's and B' s reproductions will also be 
slight, so that ifB had access to A's reproductions the trier 
of fact will be hard-pressed to decide whether B was 
copying A or copying the Mona Lisa itself(Gracen, 1983). 
In Past Pluto v. Dana (1968), the plaintiffbrought a 
copyright action concerning Statue of Liberty 
memorabilia. On appeal, the principal question 
'Recent cases show that most parties 
claiming copyright protection for 
architectural works are not the designers 
who created the original work' 
concerned whether plaintiff's work was sufficiently 
original to be copyrightable as a derivative work 
under section 103 of the Copyright Act. The court 
held as follows: 
Although derivative works may be copyrighted, see 17 
U.S.C. § 103( a), the copyright protection extends only to 
the original contributions of the derivative work's author, 
see 17 U.S. C.§ 103(b). The new copyright in no way 
embraces or protects the underlying, pre-existing 
work 
The court explained: 
If a court, upon examining a derivative work, cannot 
discern any original contribution, it follows that the 
derivative work cannot be the subject of a valid copyright. 
The Second Circuit has consistently held the derivative 
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works, in order to be copyrightable, must 'contain some 
substantial, not merely trivial originality'. 
The substantial originality rule is designed to 
prevent the extension of copyright protection to 
minuscule variations that would put a 'weapon for 
harassment' in the hands of plaintiffs. The rule is 
also designed to prohibit the appropriation and 
monopolization of work already in the public 
domain, so that where the only changes to the pre-
existing work are minuscule, the current work is not 
subject to copyright protection (Durham Industries 
v. TomyCorp, 1980). 
Similarly, where the evidence shows that 
similarities between two works can be explained by a 
prior common source or independent creation, an 
infringement claim is likely to fail, as in the case of 
Hayden v. Chalfant Press, Inc. ( 1959), where judgment 
was given to the defendant because the maps 
published by the defendant were not copied from 
plaintiffs maps: 'On the contrary, they were copied, 
with additions, from maps prepared by [a third-
party] the Automobile Club .. .' 
Consequently, to be subject to copyright 
protection, the technical drawings for a 'derivative' 
building must contain some new and substantially 
original material. If two separate works are strikingly 
similar to one another, it does not necessarily 
'The chilling effect of the legislation is to 
limit the free flow of ideas and curtail the 
architect's creative development, resulting 
instead in a limited palette of conventional, 
safe solutions- an inappropriate climate 
for the healthy development of 
architectural design ideas' 
constitute an infringement if each can be proven to 
be the result of completely independent effort. This 
is especially true where both works are derived from 
common sources and materials available to all. 
5· How will architectural design be affected by the 
protection of originality? 
On first examination, copyright protection for 
architects would seem to be an improvement on the 
previous state of affairs: buildings, not simply 
drawings, can now be protected. While the new Act 
may be generally beneficial to the profession, there 
appears to be another unintended consequence of 
the legislation which can be disadvantageous to the 
practitioner in the design realm. 
Recent cases show that most parties claiming 
copyright protection for architectural works are not 
the designers who created the original work. 
Furthermore, most of the cases have concerned 
housing units, which have hardly fallen into the 
category of cutting edge design. Thus, there has been 
a great deal of copyright activity, often by 
homebuilding companies claiming, and often 
receiving, protection for housing prototypes that are 
modest both in scale and in design aspirations. These 
plaintiffs have sued their local competitors alleging 
that the competitors' designs are copies. This raises a 
question as to the degree to which simple buildings 
can vary, given the limited number of variables in 
their composition- doors, windows, roof, etc.- and 
the necessity for all to share certain 'functional 
features' which are common to all, an issue that was 
explored previously. Simply put, there are only so 
many configurations possible between a kitchen and 
dining room, and finite possibilities of appearance 
given the volumetric and functional limitations of a 
modest functional building. 
The problem is compounded because the plaintiffs' 
designs are often not particularly original in the first 
place, deriving their form and appearance from 
traditional styles such as 'Saltbox', 'Colonial' or 
'Williams burg'. Should copyright law prohibit the 
architect from designing in a similar style to 
neighbouring properties for fear oflegal action? Such 
a chilling effect would add a strange new dimension to 
the design process by forcing the architect to strive for 
new degrees of originality based not on client 
requirements, site considerations or personal vision, 
but upon fear ofliability. Further implications of a 
design-to-be-different strategy can also be predicted at 
a collective level, where the visual impact of such 
diversity could be problematic. This concept was 
initially elaborated upon at the U.S. Senate hearings 
for the AWCP Act by a representative of the American 
Institute of Architects, who stated that: 
The pleasing aesthetic unity presented by a New England 
fishing village would have been, at best, extremely 
difficult to achieve had someone possessed a copyright on 
white clapboard Cape Cod cottages and picket fences 
(United States Congress, 1988). 
Furthermore, as copyright protection covers the 
rights of individuals on a building-by-building basis, 
it cannot deal with the notion of multiple buildings 
or, therefore, the issue of architectural precedent 
and the need to create visually coherent 
communities. In most residential neighbourhoods, 
creating visual harmony with existing surroundings 
by taking a contextual approach is a reasonable 
design strategy. If copyright protection is vigorously 
pursued in each building's case, then each new 
addition to the community should, it could be 
argued, be designed consciously to avoid any 
similarities to its neighbours- hardly a recipe for a 
coherent physical environment. Such was the case in 
the legal battle involving the Trump Tower in New 
York City where, following a successful copyright 
protection suit against the owner of a nearby 
building, changes were mandated to alter its form 
and appearance to look less like the original 
building. This, despite the fact that the buildings 
emanated from the same designer, who had assigned 
his copyright to the eponymous owner of the Trump 
Tower (Greenstreet, 1998). Arguably, the two towers 
together would have created a coherent and visually 
powerful gateway to the street and the 
neighbourhood, but copyright protection forced a 
design change to the newer building to achieve the 
opposite effect. 
If architects are forced to design each residential 
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Summary building differently, it has been suggested that the 
legislation might 'encourage architectural 
homogeneity of quite a different sort'. The AlA 
evidence at the Senate hearings reflects on the 
possible incentive architects may have to repeat their 
own earlier copyrighted work to avoid the potential 
legal exposure that creating new (and possibly 
already copyrighted) design solutions would entail. 
The chilling effect of the legislation is to limit the 
free flow of ideas and curtail the architect's creative 
development, resulting instead in a limited palette of 
conventional, safe solutions- an inappropriate 
climate for the healthy development of architectural 
design ideas. 
The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act 
1990 creates enhanced protection for architects' 
ideas that did not exist under prior legislation and as 
such should be welcomed by the profession. 
However, there are indications that there are some 
unintended consequences that may have a negative 
impact on both architectural practice and upon the 
physical environment. While there have been 
relatively few cases to date to determine the full 
extent of these issues, future case law will have to be 
watched carefully to ensure that the law created to 
help the designer does not, after all, provide more 
serious problems than the ones they purport to solve. 
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